Because it would be irresponsible to use a crackable master password to begin with (in case your local devices fall into the wrong hands or are compromised by malware), the secret key ends up being overkill. If you choose a weak password (e.g., one that is too short, or not randomly generated), then the local vault copies that are stored on your devices are very vulnerable to cracking, but with 1Password's secret key, the vault copy stored on their servers is uncrackable.Ī strong master password is one that is able to resist brute-force cracking of the vault, which requires it to have sufficient entropy (e.g., a passphrase consisting of 5-7 words randomly selected from a diceware-style word list, which corresponds to 65-90 bits of entropy). Some metadata such as last login time, last edit time, etc are not encrypted.ġPassword is more secure against a breach of the cloud servers (not against breach of a local device), if and only if you have chosen a weak (i.e., crackable) master password. Honestly, a blog post explaining how bitwarden protects user data in this context (ex: are usernames, URLs, etc encrypted) would probably be a good thing to be able to link to.Įdit: I know vaultwarden is NOT bitwarden, but if the way the data is stored is similar the usernames, URLs and notes are encrypted in the database. A confirmation from bitwarden staff would be great. To my knowledge, bitwarden encrypts user data more comprehensively, although I do not have first hand knowledge on this topic. This makes it significantly easier for an attacker who has all this data to selectively evaluate the ease of cracking a specific password, and prioritizing higher value targets such as financial credentials. Credential records (username, URL, notes, extra fields, and metadata such as the time the credentials were last used or modified) were otherwise stored unencrypted.
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